Biases in probabilistic category learning in relation to social anxiety by Anna Abraham & Christiane Hermann
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 17 August 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01218
Edited by:
Xavier Noel,
Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique –
FNRS, Belgium
Reviewed by:
Alexandre Heeren,
Université catholique de Louvain,
Belgium
Woo-Young Ahn,
Virginia Commonwealth University,
USA
*Correspondence:
Anna Abraham,
School of Social, Psychological
and Communication Sciences, Leeds
Beckett University, City Campus CL
815, Leeds LS1 3HE, UK
annaabr@gmail.com
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Psychopathology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 10 March 2015
Accepted: 03 August 2015
Published: 17 August 2015
Citation:
Abraham A and Hermann C (2015)
Biases in probabilistic category
learning in relation to social anxiety.
Front. Psychol. 6:1218.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01218
Biases in probabilistic category
learning in relation to social anxiety
Anna Abraham1,2* and Christiane Hermann2
1 School of Social, Psychological and Communication Sciences, Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK, 2 Department of
Clinical Psychology, Justus Liebig University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany
Instrumental learning paradigms are rarely employed to investigate the mechanisms
underlying acquired fear responses in social anxiety. Here, we adapted a probabilistic
category learning paradigm to assess information processing biases as a function of the
degree of social anxiety traits in a sample of healthy individuals without a diagnosis
of social phobia. Participants were presented with three pairs of neutral faces with
differing probabilistic accuracy contingencies (A/B: 80/20, C/D: 70/30, E/F: 60/40).
Upon making their choice, negative and positive feedback was conveyed using angry
and happy faces, respectively. The highly socially anxious group showed a strong
tendency to be more accurate at learning the probability contingency associated with
the most ambiguous stimulus pair (E/F: 60/40). Moreover, when pairing the most
positively reinforced stimulus or the most negatively reinforced stimulus with all the other
stimuli in a test phase, the highly socially anxious group avoided the most negatively
reinforced stimulus significantly more than the control group. The results are discussed
with reference to avoidance learning and hypersensitivity to negative socially evaluative
information associated with social anxiety.
Keywords: social anxiety, positive versus negative feedback, probabilistic learning, reinforcement learning,
instrumental learning, information processing biases
Introduction
Social anxiety refers to the feelings of uneasiness that emerge during social interactions from being
judged by other people. As the hallmark symptom of social anxiety disorder or social phobia is a
disproportionate fear of negative evaluation, an attentional bias for negative social cues, such as
angry facial expressions or averted eye gaze, are posited to lie at the root of this disorder given that
these are overt indicators of social threat or rejection (Clark andWells, 1995; Rapee and Heimberg,
1997). Evidence supporting this notion comes from both behavioral and neuroscientiﬁc studies
(Mogg et al., 2004; Sewell et al., 2008).
The idea that there is enhanced attention or “hypervigilance” to social threat information
in clinical and subclinical social anxiety has received tremendous support. For instance, when
comparing low and high socially anxious groups (HSA) in involuntary (exogenous) versus
voluntary (endogenous) direction of attention when processing threatening stimuli, Moriya and
Tanno (2011) found that the exogenous attention system is biased toward angry faces among highly
socially anxious individuals (Moriya and Tanno, 2011). But this bias for hypervigilance in social
anxiety is a temporally limited phenomenon as it is restricted to the ﬁrst 100–500 ms following the
presentation of threatening stimuli (Staugaard, 2010).
Alongside the evidence for hypervigilance in relation to social anxiety, researchers have also
documented “avoidance” strategies in the presence of social cues (Heinrichs and Hofmann,
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2001). For instance, high socially anxious individuals display
diminished attentional allocation or attentional biases away from
positive social stimuli, such as words reﬂecting positive social
evaluations (Taylor et al., 2010).
The seemingly diverging ﬁndings of both hypervigilance
toward and avoidance of negative social cues have been
accommodated into a common framework (Mogg et al., 1997;
Amir et al., 1998) where social anxiety is held to be characterized
by hypervigilance during the initial phase of information
processing of threatening social stimuli followed by avoidance of
such stimuli at a later phase. The impact of such attentional biases
have been investigated in the context of learning mechanisms
in social anxiety, particularly in terms of conditioned fear
(Hermann et al., 2002; Gros et al., 2009; Ly and Roelofs, 2009;
McTeague et al., 2009; Lissek, 2012; Pejic et al., 2013). Lissek et al.
(2008), for instance, reported that a group of participants with
social anxiety disorder compared to an unaﬀected control group
demonstrated elevated fear conditioning in response to negative
facial expressions. This was evidenced by a potentiation in the
startle-blink reﬂex when angry faces were the conditioned stimuli
compared to neutral or happy facial expressions. As the group
diﬀerences were not dependent on levels of anxiety elicited by the
unconditioned stimulus, associative processes appeared to be the
active mechanism underlying the enhanced conditioned startle-
potentiation among the individuals with social anxiety disorder
(Lissek et al., 2008).
Although clinically relevant information processing biases in
associative processing can also be assessed using instrumental
learning paradigms, few studies have explored this avenue in
the case of social anxiety (Cavanagh et al., 2011b; Button et al.,
2012; Stevens et al., 2014). The learning process in Pavlovian
learning or classical conditioning refers to the elicitation of an
innate response to a neutral stimulus that comes to occur as a
consequence of repeated pairings of the neutral stimulus with a
potent stimulus, which automatically elicits that innate response.
Operant conditioning or instrumental learning diﬀers in that
the learning process reﬂects how a response is shaped by a
reinforcing stimulus that follows it, with positive consequences
leading to strengthening of the response and negative outcomes
leading to a weakening of the response. One important rationale
behind evaluating instrumental learning in the context of clinical
disorders is that the focus in classical conditioning is either on
positive or on negative learning eﬀects, but not the integrated
eﬀect of both together. Being able to incorporate both positive
and negative elements of the complex learning processes and to
study how individualsmake appropriate responses within a single
paradigm enables a more nuanced approach to understanding
information processing biases.
Probabilistic instrumental learning paradigms allow for the
investigation of how stimulus–response associations are learnt
through trial-and-error, and provide the opportunity to evaluate
the factors that serve as modulators in such situations. We take
decisions on a regular basis about how to optimally respond
in any given situation, and the strategies we adopt in taking
these decisions are guided by our previous experiences of
the relations and contingencies between events, actions, and
outcomes. Probabilistic paradigms are more ecologically valid
than their deterministic counterparts as uncertainty about the
contingencies between events, actions, and outcomes are intrinsic
to our environment.
In probabilistic categorization learning, the same stimuli
belong to multiple categories of varying probabilities. As a
result, a response to stimulus can be reinforced as either correct
or incorrect on a probabilistic basis and this feedback drives
category learning (Craig and Baron-Cohen, 1999; Kruschke and
Johansen, 1999; Ashby and Maddox, 2005). While learning is
abetted by both positive action outcomes (leading to repetition
of successful behavior) and negative action outcomes (leading
to avoidance of erroneous behavior), some studies have shown
that the degree to which one learns from successes versus
errors varies across individuals as a function of genetic makeup
(Klein et al., 2007; Frank and Hutchison, 2009), neurological
or psychiatric disorders (Chase et al., 2010; Averbeck et al.,
2011; Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Endrass et al., 2011; Shiner et al.,
2012), pharmacological manipulations (Frank et al., 2004), or
even interventions using brain stimulation (Ott et al., 2011).
Reinforcement learning models have been applied to understand
the nature of psychological dysfunctions associated with several
psychiatric disorders, including attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) and schizophrenia (Maia and Frank, 2011).
The objective of the current study was to assess potential
information processing biases associated with heightened levels
of social anxiety in a non-clinical sample. Volunteers were
selected to participate in the study based on their scores on
a self-report scale, that they ﬁlled out during a pre-screening
session, which assessed their fear of being evaluated negatively,
the central cognitive symptom of social anxiety1. We expected
group-based diﬀerences in instrumental learning based on the
aforementioned literature on conditioned fear, but the nature
or direction of this diﬀerence was exploratory due to the
paucity of research on instrumental learning in social anxiety.
A probabilistic category learning paradigm was adapted to
this end using socially relevant information as stimuli (neutral
faces) and socially evaluative reinforcement as feedback (positive:
happy faces, negative: angry faces). Group-based behavioral
diﬀerences were assessed by comparing performances of a high
socially anxious group (HSA) relative to non-socially anxious
counterparts (NSA) during learning of stimulus pairs associated
with varying probabilistic contingencies (A/B: 80/20, C/D: 70/30,
E/F: 60/40). In the learning phase, group based diﬀerences
were evaluated in terms of the percentages by which high
probabilistic stimuli (A, C, E) were chosen relative to low
probabilistic stimuli (B, D, F). In the test phase, group based
diﬀerences were appraised in terms of the percentages associated
with choosing the most positively reinforced stimulus (A) and
choosing the most negatively reinforced stimulus (B) over all
other stimuli.
The rationale in investigating information processing biases
in a non-clinical sample associated with a high degree of social
anxiety traits follows from the dimensional nature of social
1Please note that the fear of negative evaluation and social anxiety are not
synonymous constructs. The fear of negative evaluation is the core symptom of
social anxiety disorder or social phobia.
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anxiety (e.g., Kollman et al., 2006; Crome et al., 2010). Indeed,
the evidence suggests that a core cognitive component of social
anxiety, namely the fear of negative evaluation, is dimensional in
nature (Weeks et al., 2009). Following this line of thought, the
study of analogue samples of individuals with a high degree of
social anxiety traits has a long tradition in research on cognitive
mechanisms and learning processes that are relevant to social
anxiety, such as attentional biases (Pineles and Mineka, 2005;
Klumpp and Amir, 2009), post-event processing (Dannahy and
Stopa, 2007), and avoidance learning (Ly and Roelofs, 2009).
Analogue studies are not a substitute for clinical investigations
but constitute an alternative subclinical approach that allows
investigators to evaluate many assumptions concerning the
underpinnings of clinical disorders. The usefulness of combining
insights from both clinical and subclinical approaches in order
to understand information processing mechanisms that underlie
psychiatric disorders has been widely acknowledged (e.g., OCD:
Abramowitz et al., 2014; PTSD: Ehring et al., 2011; Anxiety: Tull
et al., 2009; Depression: Vredenburg et al., 1993).
Materials and Methods
Participants
The sample selection was carried out by screening 280
undergraduate student volunteers enrolled at the University of
Giessen in Germany who completed the German version of the
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson and Friend,
1969; Vormbrock and Neuser, 1983; M = 45.26, SD = 10.01).
The FNE is a widely employed social anxiety measure, which
assesses the degree of fear toward criticism (e.g., “I often worry
that I will say or do the wrong things”). On the basis of their
FNE scores, 80 participants were selected and assigned to one of
two groups for the main study. The HSA included participants
who obtained an FNE score greater than the Mean + 1 SD
while the NSA included those who obtained a score between
Mean ± 1 SD2.
All participants were native German speakers with no reported
history of neurological or psychiatric illness (telephone screening
prior to recruitment). None were taking medication at the time
of measurement. All gave informed consent before participation
and received either payment (EUR 8) or course credits for their
participation. The experimental standards of the study were
approved by the Local Ethics Committee of the Justus Liebig
University of Giessen in Germany.
After excluding participants who did not meet the inclusion
criteria for data analysis (details provided below in the subsection
on Exclusion Criteria), the ﬁnal sample included 62 participants
within two subgroups: HSA (n = 30; 17 males; mean age = 22.5;
age range = 19–29) and NSA (n = 32; 15 males; mean
age = 22.59; age range = 19–27). The HSA and NSA groups
were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerentiable in terms of age (t60 = 0.16,
p = 0.87) or gender (χ2 = 0.59, p = 0.46). All the reported
statistical analyses below were carried out on this ﬁnal sample.
2The rationale behind adopting this approach of classiﬁcation includes (a)
approximately normal distribution of screening sample scores, and (b) avoiding
the problem of regression to mean (Preacher et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2014).
Following the experiment, all participants completed the
German versions of the Social Phobia Scale (SPS) and Social
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick and Clarke, 1998;
Stangier et al., 1999). The SPS and SIAS assess the fear of being
observed during routine tasks and general social interactions
(e.g., “I have diﬃculty talking with other people”). The descriptive
data for the self-report measures across all groups are given in
Table 1. The HSA were found to have signiﬁcantly higher scores
than the NSA on all the three measures of social anxiety: the FNE
(t60 = 12.23, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 3.13), the SPS (t60 = 5.67,
p < 0.001, d = 1.43), and the SIAS (t60 = 6.34, p < 0.001,
d = 1.6), indicating that the HSA group was signiﬁcantly
more socially anxious than the NSA group. There were no
gender diﬀerences across any of the social anxiety measures (all
p > 0.1), and assessing the reliability coeﬃcient of the scales
within the sample revealed a high degree of internal consistency
(FNE3: Cronbach’s α = 0.717; SPS: Cronbach’s α = 0.898; SIAS:
Cronbach’s α = 0.892).
Experimental Task
The probabilistic category selection task was adapted for use
in the current study (Frank et al., 2004). The diﬀerence that
was instantiated in the present paradigm was that faces were
employed as the learning stimuli (neutral faces) and feedback
stimuli (happy and angry faces; Lundqvist et al., 1998). The
selection of faces was based on ratings of an unpublished pilot
study where the faces with best match to the emotions being
portrayed were selected. In line with the protocol used a previous
study on learning (Stevens et al., 2014), male faces were employed
as learning and feedback stimuli for the female participants and
vice versa. The experiment was separated into two phases: a
learning phase and a test phase. Both phases were programmed
using Presentation R© software (www.neurobs.com), which was
3Based on a sample of n = 43 as the data ﬁle with the individual FNE items of the
whole sample was found to be corrupt, and we were therefore unable to access this
particular data.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive data of all the self-report dependent measures.
HSA NSA All
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
N (Female: Male) 30 (13:17) 32 (17:15) 62 (30:32)
Age 22.50 2.43 22.59 2.15 22.55 2.27
FNE 62.00 4.81 42.94 7.16 52.16 11.37
SPS 23.90 11.07 10.75 6.82 17.11 11.21
SIAS 30.93 11.79 15.28 7.27 22.85 12.45
Angry (SAM Valence) 2.53 1.38 3.16 1.72 2.85 1.59
Neutral (SAM Valence) 4.54 0.81 4.51 0.86 4.52 0.83
Happy (SAM Valence) 7.27 1.72 7.13 1.84 7.19 1.77
Angry (SAM Arousal) 6.77 1.77 6.16 1.87 6.45 1.84
Neutral (SAM Arousal) 3.80 0.73 3.50 1.00 3.64 0.89
Happy (SAM Arousal) 4.50 2.36 3.75 1.87 4.11 2.14
FNE, Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; HSA, high social anxiety group; NSA, non-
socially anxious group; SAM, Self-Assessment Manikin Ratings of the Face Stimuli;
SIAS, Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; SPS, Social Phobia Scale.
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also used to present the stimuli (size: 270 × 220) (resolution:
800 × 600) via a computer screen (resolution: 800 × 600).
Participants were seated 60 cm away from the screen to perform
the task (visual angle: 14.26◦ × 5.53◦).
In the learning phase, subjects were presented with one of
three diﬀerent stimulus pairs of neutral faces (Face A and Face
B, Face C and Face D, Face E and Face F) in each trial (140
trials per pair). The subjects were instructed to learn which one of
the faces within each stimulus pair (AB, CD, EF) was associated
with more positive feedback and to optimize their performance
to be as accurate as possible in making their responses. The
three stimulus pairs were presented in pseudo-randomized order
(e.g., equivalent occurrence of all trial transition types). The
subjects had to select one of the two stimuli that were presented
on each trial by pressing the appropriate response key on the
keyboard using the index and middle ﬁngers of the right hand
(left arrow key to select the face presented on the left of the
screen, right arrow key to select the face presented on the right
of the screen). After they had indicated their choice, feedback
immediately followed to indicate whether this choice was correct
(in the form of a happy face) or incorrect (in the form of an
angry face) for that trial (Figure 1). The identities of the faces
used as the experimental stimuli (neutral faces A – F) were
distinct from those of the feedback stimuli (happy and angry
faces).
This feedback was probabilistic in that in AB trials, the choice
of stimulus A led to positive feedback in 80% of the trials and
negative feedback in 20% of the trials. Choosing B therefore led
to negative feedback in 80% of the trials and positive feedback
on 20% of the trials. CD and EF pairs were less reliable as
choosing C over D led to positive feedback in 70% of the trials
and negative feedback in 30% of the trials. Choosing E over
F led to positive feedback in 60% of the trials and negative
feedback in 40% of the trials. The probabilistic contingencies
associated with each of the three pairs were unknown to
participants in advance. They acquired this knowledge over the
learning phase in which they learned, through feedback on their
responses, to choose the A, C, and E high positive feedback
FIGURE 1 | Sequence of trial events. (Top) The representation of trial events
in the Learning Phase of the study. Each trial begins with a blank screen which
is presented for 2300 ms, followed by a pair of neutral face stimuli for 1500 ms.
Subjects are instructed to indicate with a key press (left or right) which of the
two faces is the correct option in the current trial. Based on the accuracy of the
subject’s choice, s/he is given positive feedback (happy face) or negative
feedback (angry face) that is presented for 700 ms between the neutral face
stimuli. If the subjects take too long to respond, they receive feedback in the
form of a message between the neutral face stimuli stating “Oops! Too Late”
(not shown in the Figure). This is followed by the presentation of a blank screen
(2300 ms) which marks the commencement of the next trial. (Bottom) The
representation of trial events during the Test Phase of the study. Each trial
begins with a blank screen which is presented for 2300 ms, followed by a pair of
neutral face stimuli for 1500 ms. Subjects are instructed to indicate with a key
press (left or right) which of the two presented neutral faces is the correct
option. No feedback on the responses is given within the test phase. This is
followed by the presentation of a blank screen (2300 ms) which marks the
commencement of the next trial.
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probability stimuli (or the low negative feedback probability
stimuli) more often than the B, D, and F low positive feedback
probability stimuli (or the high negative feedback probability
stimuli).
Participants learned about these probability contingencies
through positive feedback (e.g., seeing a happy face more often
when choosing A) and negative feedback (e.g., seeing an angry
face more often when choosing B). A test phase was carried
out to determine if participants learned more from the positive
or negative consequences of their responses by presenting them
novel combinations of stimulus pairs that were not encountered
during the learning phase. The A and B stimuli were presented
in combination with all other stimuli (AC, AD, AE, AF, BC, BD,
BE, BF). There were 48 A-trials and 48 B-trials, and no feedback
was provided after the choice response during the test phase
(Figure 1). The percentage of choices for the A stimulus over
the others reﬂected the degree to which participants learned from
positive reinforcers as the contingency of positive feedback was
highest for the A stimulus. The percentage of avoidance responses
toward the B stimulus (i.e., not choosing B) over the others
reﬂected the degree to which participants learned from negative
reinforcers as the contingency of negative feedback was highest
for the B stimulus.
Following the test phase, participants were required to rate
all the faces they were presented with during the experiment
(choice stimuli and feedback cues) using the nine-point Self-
Assessment Manikin Scale (SAM; Bradley and Lang, 1994) in
terms of valence (ranging from 1–9: “extremely pleasant” to
“extremely unpleasant”) and arousal (ranging from 1–9: “calm”
to “excited”).
Exclusion Criteria
To ensure that all participants within the ﬁnal sample were
comparable in terms of their behavioral performance, three
a priori exclusion criteria were applied4. The ﬁrst criterion
involved excluding participants who were below average learners.
For this purpose, the percentage by which stimulus A (Group
MeanA = 76.19, SDA = 14.10) and stimulus C (Group
MeanC = 72.99, SDC = 16.96) were selected by each participant
in the learning phase were used to discriminate between
successful and unsuccessful learners. Any participant whose score
lay more than 1.5 SD below the group mean (Cut-oﬀA < 55.04,
Cut-oﬀC < 47.55) was classiﬁed an unsuccessful learner and was
excluded from the ﬁnal sample. Thirteen participants (HSA = 6,
NSA = 7) were excluded from the original pool of subjects
(n = 80) on the basis of this ﬁrst criterion5.
4These exclusion criteria were developed to address the objectives of this study.
There are no clearly established norms for rejecting participants in this task. Many
studies do not mention which exclusion criteria, if any, were applied (e.g., Klein
et al., 2007; Cavanagh et al., 2011a; Endrass et al., 2011) while others clearly impose
criteria (e.g., Frank et al., 2004; Ott et al., 2011) but these parameters diﬀer between
studies and/or have been described with insuﬃcient detail and/or are suboptimal
with regard to establishing whether learning actually took place.
5Please note that it is possible that some participants may have learned the task
despite being 1.5 SD below the mean in accuracies. A stringent cut-oﬀ level was
maintained to exercise caution in order to allow sound interpretations of the
ﬁndings in this exploratory study.
The second criterion was based on the SAM valence ratings
of the stimuli where subjects were excluded if they rated the
happy faces to be more negative than the angry or neutral faces
and/or the angry faces to be more positive than the happy or
neutral faces. This is because, in such situations, it could not
be claimed that the participants experienced positive feedback
when presented with the happy face or negative feedback when
presented with the angry face. Five participants (HSA = 2,
NSA = 3) were excluded from the original pool of subjects on
the basis of this criterion.
The third criterion was that any participant who had more
than 10% misses (no response made within the allotted 1500 ms)
during the learning phase would be excluded as a high proportion
of misses indicates inattentiveness during the experiment. None
of the participants were excluded on the basis of this criterion.
Statistical Analyses
Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to determine (a) the
optimization of the stimulus characterization, (b) which variables
inﬂuenced choice patterns in the learning phase, and (c) which
variables inﬂuenced choice patterns in the test phase.T-tests were
used for planned pairwise and independent samples contrasts.
Eﬀect sizes are also reported – partial eta-squared for the
ANOVAs and Cohen’s d for the t-tests.
Results
The descriptive data associated with the groups across all
variables are displayed in Table 1 (stimulus characterization),
Table 2 (learning phase) and Table 3 (test phase)6.
6As a check, all analyses were carried out using gender as the between-subjects
factor. There were no signiﬁcant gender-related diﬀerences (main and interaction
eﬀects) with regard to stimulus characterization, performance in the learning
phase, and performance in the test phase (all p> 0.1).
TABLE 2 | Descriptive data of dependent measures from the learning
phase of the experiment.
HSA NSA
Mean SD Mean SD
Percentage chosen (over all trials)∗
A (80% correct) 77.10 11.94 81.76 11.17
B (20% correct) 18.36 9.50 15.11 10.12
C (70% correct) 76.07 14.33 76.29 11.01
D (30% correct) 19.81 11.62 21.05 10.42
E (60% correct) 69.40 15.72 76.68 14.40
F (40% correct) 26.90 13.56 21.00 13.79
Percentage chosen difference
B–A (60% difference) 58.74 21.01 66.65 21.18
D–C (40% difference) 56.26 25.51 55.25 21.33
F–E (20% difference) 42.49 28.97 55.67 28.15
∗Please note that the percentage chosen within each stimulus pair (AB, CD, EF)
may not sum to 100% due to the fact that there were some misses (responses
that were too slow and outside the response window). HSA, high socially anxious
group; NSA, non-socially anxious group.
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TABLE 3 | Descriptive data of dependent measures from the test phase of
the experiment.
HSA NSA
Mean SD Mean SD Significance (two-tailed)
Choose A 51.25 27.29 62.63 28.15 0.112
Avoid B 74.72 20.37 64.19 18.88 0.039
HSA, high socially anxious group; NSA, non-socially anxious group.
Stimulus Characterization
The 3 × 2 ANOVA (stimulus: positive/neutral/negative × group:
HSA/NSA) for the SAM ratings of stimulus-associated valence
revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect (linear trend) for stimulus
(F1,60 = 205.21, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.77). Angry faces were rated
as signiﬁcantly more negative than neutral and happy faces, while
neutral faces were rated as signiﬁcantly more negative than happy
faces (planned pairwise contrasts: all t61 > 7.73, p < 0.001,
d > 1.32; Figure 2A).
The 3 × 2 ANOVA (stimulus: positive/neutral/
negative × group: HSA/NSA) for the SAM ratings of stimulus-
associated arousal revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect (quadratic
trend) for stimulus (F1,60 = 59.88, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.50;
Figure 2A). Angry faces were rated as signiﬁcantly more
arousing than neutral and happy faces (planned pairwise
contrasts: all t61 > 7.22, p < 0.001, d > 1.18). However, happy
faces were not rated as being signiﬁcantly more arousing than
neutral faces (t61 = 1.61, p = 0.113, d = 0.28).
While no interaction eﬀects were found across both analyses,
one revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for group (F1,60 = 4.14,
p = 0.046; η2p = 0.065) on the dependent variable of stimulus-
associated arousal, which indicated that the HSA reported
signiﬁcantly more arousal than the NSA when viewing the
face stimuli in general, regardless of the associated valence
(Figure 2B).
In sum, the analyses revealed an optimal stimulus
characterization such that angry faces were appraised as
being more negative than happy and neutral faces, and neutral
faces were appraised as being more negative than happy
faces (angry > neutral > happy). Angry faces were also
appraised as being more arousing than happy and neutral
faces (angry > neutral, angry > happy). In addition, the HSA
experienced generally higher levels of arousal when viewing the
face stimuli compared to the NSA.
Experiment: Learning Phase
The 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA (probabilistic pair:
AB/CD/EF × probability: high/low × group: HSA/NSA)
on percent chosen revealed signiﬁcant main eﬀects for
probabilistic pair (F1,60 = 9.4, p = 0.003; η2p = 0.135)
and probability (F1,60 = 503.52, p < 0.001; η2p = 0.894)
alongside a signiﬁcant two-way linear interaction eﬀect for
probabilistic pair × probability (F1,60 = 17.21, p < 0.001;
η2p = 0.223). Together these ﬁndings indicated that learning
had successfully taken place as high positive feedback
probability stimuli were selected more often than low positive
feedback probability stimuli. Moreover, the diﬀerences in
probability contingencies of each of the stimuli across the
probabilistic pairs were also successfully learnt (Figure 2C:
A:80 > C:70 > E:60 > F:40 > D:30 > B:20, planned pairwise
contrasts: all t61 > 1.08, p< 0.076).
There was also a signiﬁcant three-way quadratic interaction
eﬀect for probabilistic pair × probability × group (F1,60 = 4.25,
p = 0.044; η2p = 0.066) on percent chosen. This interaction was
driven by trends for the HSA group (E: 69%, F: 27%) to more
accurately estimate the probability contingency corresponding to
the E (t60 = 1.9, p = 0.062, d = 0.48) and F (t60 = 1.7, p = 0.095,
d = 0.43) probabilistic pair (actual contingency: E: 60%, F: 40%)
compared to the NSA group (E: 77%, F: 21%).
As the latter was an unexpected ﬁnding, further analyses were
carried out to assess the sensitivity of the groups in learning the
feedback-associated probability contingency diﬀerences between
the pairs. The actual positive feedback probability diﬀerence
between probabilistic AB pair is 60% (as 80%–20% = 60%) and
those of the CD and EF pairs are 40 and 20%, respectively.
By subtracting the percentages by which low positive feedback
probability option in each pair was chosen from the high
positive feedback probability option (B–A, D–C, F–E), the chosen
probability diﬀerences between the three pairs was calculated.
The between group contrasts revealed that the HSA group
tended to more accurately detect the diﬀerence between the EF
probabilistic pair (t60 = 1.82, p = 0.074, d = 0.46) than the NSA
group. The HSA and NSA groups were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
in detecting the AB (p = 0.145) and CD (p = 0.865) probabilistic
pair diﬀerences (Figure 2D).
In summary, the results from the learning phase demonstrated
that the probabilistic task with its diﬀerent probability
contingencies across stimulus pairs was successfully learnt
by all participants. The HSA tended to be more accurate
than the NSA at detecting the actual probability contingency
diﬀerence between the most ambiguous probabilistic pair: E
(60% probability of positive feedback) and F (40% probability of
positive feedback).
Experiment: Test Phase
A 2 × 2 ANOVA (choice type: choose A/avoid B × group:
HSA/NSA) on percent chosen revealed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect for choice type (F1,60 = 9.83, p = 0.003; η2p = 0.141)
alongside a signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect for choice type × group
(F1,60 = 7.53, p = 0.008; η2p = 0.112). Between group analyses
revealed that the HSA and NSA groups did not signiﬁcantly diﬀer
from one another in the degree to which they chose A (51.25 and
62.63%, respectively), the most positively reinforced stimulus in
the learning phase, over the other stimuli (p = 0.112). However,
the HSA avoided B (74.72%), the most negative reinforced
stimulus in the learning phase, signiﬁcantly more often than the
NSA (64.19%; t60 = 2.11, p= 0.039, d= 0.54; Figure 2E;Table 3).
Discussion
The objective of this study was to investigate potential
information processing biases in instrumental learning associated
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Findings from the self-assessment manikin (SAM) ratings
(Mean ± 1 SE) of the face stimuli on Valence (pleasant–unpleasant). Angry
faces were rated to be significantly more unpleasant than the happy and
neutral faces, and neutral faces were rated as significantly more unpleasant
than happy faces (all p < 0.001). (B) Findings from the SAM ratings
(Mean ± 1 SE) of the face stimuli on Arousal (calm to excited). Angry faces
were rated to be significantly more arousing than the happy and neutral
faces (all p < 0.001). The HSA reported a generally higher level of arousal
when viewing the face stimuli than the NSA (p < 0.05). (C) Results from the
Learning Phase showing successful learning (percentage accuracy:
Mean ± 1 SE) of the probabilistic task. On being presented with the three
probabilistic pairs (AB, CD, EF), the high probability stimuli (A, C, E) within
each pair (dark line) were selected more often than their corresponding low
probability stimuli (B, D, F; light line). Differences in probability contingencies
of the stimuli were also successfully learnt (A > C > E > F > D > B).
(D) Results from the Learning Phase (Mean ± 1 SE) showing that the HSA
more accurately detected the actual probability difference between the EF
pair than the NSA. (E) Results from the Test Phase (Mean ± 1 SE) showing
that the HSA group avoided B, the most punished stimulus, significantly
more than the NSA (∗p < 0.05).
with social anxiety. A probabilistic category learning task with
socially evaluative feedback was used for this purpose. To ensure
the validity of the associated ﬁndings, it was necessary to establish
that the sample and stimulus characterizations were optimally
executed and that the probability contingencies in the experiment
were adequately learnt within the training phase. Successful
implementation of the experimental paradigmwas established on
all these counts.
In terms of sample characterization, the high social anxiety
group relative to the control group reported experiencing
signiﬁcantly higher levels of social anxiety as well as greater
subjective physiological arousal upon viewing faces. This is
consistent with other ﬁndings in the literature (Westberg
et al., 2007). The stimulus characterization analyses revealed
that all participants judged the angry faces to be the most
unpleasant stimuli, followed by the neutral faces, both relative
to the happy faces. Moreover, the whole group analyses
from the learning phase of the probabilistic category learning
experiment revealed that learning had successfully taken place
as the participants’ choices reﬂected acquired knowledge of the
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diﬀerences between the probability contingencies of all six stimuli
(A:80> C:70> E:60> F:40 >D:30 > B:20).
High Social Anxiety: Evidence for Information
Processing Advantages
While the groups did not diﬀer in terms of overall learning
performance, the HSA tended to be more sensitive at detecting
the actual probabilistic contingencies for the most ambiguous
stimulus pair (E/F) during the learning phase than the control
group. Speciﬁcally, high socially anxious individuals were better
at learning the reinforcement contingencies between stimuli that
were associated with a high degree of ambiguity given that they
manifest relatively subtle diﬀerences in terms of the degree of
positive-to-negative reinforcers (E: 60% positive, 40% negative;
F: 40% positive, 60% negative).
This is a interesting ﬁnding that warrants further exploration
as it indicates greater sensitivity on the part of the HSA to
recognize the actual contingency of positive-to-negative social
feedback in highly uncertain or ambiguous contexts. This
observation matches well with previous ﬁndings that have
demonstrated greater accuracy in individuals with social phobia
in detecting the actual contingencies between social cues and
their associated positive, neutral, or aversive outcomes (Hermann
et al., 2004).
A related possibility to consider would be that if the HSA
are biased to learn more from socially negative reinforcement,
their superior performance on learning the actual contingencies
of the E/F pair would be a likely outcome as far more negative
feedback is received when responding to this stimulus pair
compared to the other less ambiguous pairs. Higher accuracy
in estimating the probability of aversive stimuli has, in fact,
been reported by Ly and Roelofs (2009). Social phobia patients
were better at such estimations during an avoidance task when
the avoidance response was no longer available compared to
low socially anxious individuals who underestimated the actual
probability of the aversive stimulus.
In general though, evidence suggesting the presence of
general information processing advantages as a function of
social anxiety is somewhat mixed. Some studies have reported
poor performance associated with social anxiety, such as in the
domain of executive function (Fujii et al., 2013), others report
better performance, such as in the domain of working memory
(Moriya and Sugiura, 2012), and still others present a mixed
picture (Amir and Bomyea, 2011). Amir and Bomyea (2011),
for instance, reported that, relative to a control group, patients
with generalized social phobia demonstrated comparable verbal
working memory capacity for social stimuli but poorer verbal
working memory capacity for neutral stimuli. They attributed
this dissociation in the ﬁndings to the possibility that “enhanced
working memory capacity for threat relevant information may be
the result of practice with this information.”
On the other hand, a recent study showcased enhanced
performance in relation to social anxiety from the domain of
visual working memory, where high levels of social anxiety were
found to be associated with high visual working memory capacity
(Moriya and Sugiura, 2012). However, it should be noted that
these advantages in information processing in relation to social
anxiety were assessed in terms of general cognitive capacities
using socially irrelevant stimuli. In contrast, only socially relevant
information (learning and feedback stimuli) were employed in
the present study. One avenue for exploration therefore would
be to assess whether the apparently heightened sensitivity in
learning on the part of the HSA is domain-general (greater
accuracy in learning in ambiguous contexts regardless of the type
of stimuli or feedback) or domain-speciﬁc (greater accuracy in
learning of socially relevant information in ambiguous contexts;
for a discussion on domain speciﬁcity in relation to social anxiety,
see Abraham et al., 2013).
High Social Anxiety: Learning via Greater
Sensitivity to Negative Social Cues
The test phase of the probabilistic category learning paradigm
was used to assess whether diﬀerences would surface in terms
of how the groups learned from positive feedback (choosing
stimulus A) or negative feedback (avoiding stimulus B). Although
diﬀering degrees of social anxiety did not inﬂuence overall
performance in the learning phase, it exerted a signiﬁcant impact
on the pattern of performance in the test phase. Both groups were
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerentiable in terms of the degree to which
they chose the most positively reinforced stimulus (A) from the
learning phase. However, the HSA avoided the most negative
reinforced stimulus (B) from the learning phase signiﬁcantly
more often than the control group. This stimulus was the one
with the least favorable odds of positive reinforcement, and
hence most strongly associated with the presentation of the
angry face. The response pattern of the HSA hence indicated a
relatively enhanced propensity to avoid cues that are associated
with negative social evaluation.
The complete opposite of this pattern, namely a decreased
likelihood to avoid the most negatively reinforced stimulus, using
the same probabilistic learning paradigm, albeit with non-social
stimuli, has been associated with the presence of the A1 allele
of the human genetic polymorphism (DRD2-TAQ-IA; Klein
et al., 2007). This allele is associated with a reduction in the D2
dopamine receptor density in the brain, which in turn is related
to the manifestation of addictive and compulsive behaviors (but
see Anokhin, 2014). So while decreased avoidance of the most
negative reinforced stimulus using this kind of probabilistic
paradigm has been linked with a reduced sensitivity to negative
behavioral consequences (Klein et al., 2007), the present study
shows that increased avoidance of the most negative reinforced
stimulus is associated with heightened sensitivity to negative
social consequences.
Other psychiatric and neurological populations have also been
associated with diﬀerent patterns of activity using probabilistic
category learning paradigms. For instance, depression was
associated with deﬁcits in reward-based decision making
(choosing A) during probabilistic learning as well as a high degree
of variability in action selection (Kunisato et al., 2012, but see
Chase et al., 2010; Cavanagh et al., 2011a for opposing ﬁndings).
Unmedicated patients with Parkinson’s disease, in contrast, were
found to be better at learning to avoid choices that lead to
negative outcomes than learning from positive outcomes. The
ingestion of dopamine medication, however, led to a reversal
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of this response pattern (Frank et al., 2004). Reinforcement
learning models are proving to be invaluable in understanding
the brain and cognitive dysfunctions associated with several other
psychiatric and neurological disorders as well, such as Tourette’s
syndrome, ADHD, drug addiction and schizophrenia (Maia and
Frank, 2011). The present ﬁndings indicate the promise of this
approach in unraveling information processing biases that are
speciﬁc to social anxiety.
The ﬁnding of greater avoidance learning in relation to
social anxiety ﬁts well with several studies that have shown
that social anxiety is related to an increased sensitivity to
negative social information. For instance, in comparison to a
low socially anxious group, highly socially anxious individuals
not only recalled a higher ratio of negative-to-positive images
and memories on the Waterloo Images and Memories Interview
(WIMI), but also reported poorer episodic detail in the retrieved
positive images (Moscovitch et al., 2011). A preference for
negative social feedback has also been associated with social
anxiety (Valentiner et al., 2011). Indeed, a comparison of high
and low speech anxious participants revealed that highly speech
anxious individuals displayed an internal attentional bias that was
restricted to socially evaluative threat (Mansell et al., 2003).
That this hypersensitivity to negative or ambiguous social
information may translate to greater avoidance of the same has
also been documented in previous studies. Using a probabilistic
Go/No-Go paradigm, Ly et al. (2014), for instance, compared
individuals with diﬀering tendencies for social avoidance and
found that the high social avoidance group exhibited reduced
behavioral inhibition for angry faces relative to happy faces.
This failure to inhibit behavior related to aversive social stimuli
was held to reﬂect why socially avoidant individuals perceive
situations as more threatening than they are and consequently
expect more negative attributions and outcomes. Previous studies
have reported enhanced avoidance learning in relation to social
anxiety in response to socially ambiguous stimuli, such as
neutral faces (Stevens et al., 2014), as well an greater aversive
expectancy bias when social situations are ambiguous during
avoidance conditioning (Ly and Roelofs, 2009). The present
ﬁndings contribute to this line of research by showing an
information processing bias in relation to social anxiety to learn
via avoidance strategies. As only social stimuli were used in the
current study, it will be useful to assess whether these biases are
restricted to contexts that are socially evaluative or whether they
are generalizable to non-social contexts, as is the case in several
psychiatric and neurological populations.
Caveats to Bear in Mind
It is important to note that there are other probabilistic learning
paradigms that are widely adopted in the literature, such as
the probabilistic classiﬁcation learning task (Gluck and Bower,
1988; Knowlton et al., 1994) and the Iowa Gambling task
(Bechara et al., 1997; Brevers et al., 2013), which diﬀer from
the present probabilistic category learning task with regard
to context, learning outcomes, probabilistic contingencies, task
strategy, and so on. Studies using such paradigms have indicated
that the probabilistic learning of emotional contents are hindered
by heightened fear (Thomas and LaBar, 2008; Exner et al.,
2014; Zetsche et al., 2015), such as in the case of obsessive
compulsive disorder. However, as there has been little discussion
thus far about the commonalities and distinctions between
the properties of the diﬀerent probabilistic paradigms, it is
challenging to integrate such ﬁndings within the context of
the current study. Other factors that diﬀerentiate between the
tasks include the numbers of stimuli/cues used in the task as
well as the parameters to determine the contingencies of the
stimuli/cues. In the current task, the contingencies of each
stimulus is incumbent on the other stimulus within the pair
(A:B = 80:20, C:D = 70:30, E:F = 60:40). In contrast, in the
probabilistic classiﬁcation learning and Iowa gambling tasks, the
stimulus/cue is independently associated with each outcome.
Such factors together with other diﬀerences in stimulus type and
task contingencies as well as type of sample under study render if
diﬃcult to compare the ﬁndings from our study with others that
employ these alternative paradigms.
The present probabilistic category learning task allows us to
examine whether participants are more sensitive to learn from
reward versus punishment based on the relative dominance of the
learned associations between the cues and the negative or positive
outcomes. In contrast, in probabilistic classiﬁcation learning and
Iowa gambling tasks, participants are required to develop a
strategy to best predict a negative outcome versus its absence,
but it is not tested whether participants learn more from positive
as opposed to negative reinforcement (but see Busemeyer and
Stout, 2002; Ahn et al., 2014). Notably, highly fearful individuals
(Thomas and LaBar, 2008) or those suﬀering from clinical
disorder such as OCD (Exner et al., 2014) only demonstrated
impaired learning when emotionally relevant cues were used
within an emotionally relevant context. For example, participants
were asked to predict what they would encounter when walking
in the woods (Thomas and LaBar, 2008) or assume having to
predict an epidemic as part of their job (Exner et al., 2014).
Such contexts may induce situational anxiety that interferes
with associative learning. Indeed, patients with social phobia
were less likely to rely on optimal strategies in both a standard
and an emotional probabilistic task using disease/contamination-
relevant cues (i.e., no socially threatening materials), an eﬀect
which was mediated by situational anxiety (Zetsche et al., 2015).
In the present study, except for using socially relevant cues and
outcomes, no cover story was used to create a socially threatening
context.
Limitations and Future Directions
It would have been useful to analyze if the groups diﬀered in
terms of their learning curves in the acquisition of the diﬀerent
probabilistic contingencies in the training phase. This would
require that the trials be discretely separated into several blocks
such that the overall contingencies (i.e., A: 80% and B: 20 %
positive reinforcement) are modeled within each of the blocks. As
group diﬀerences were not expected within the training phase, a
detailed block structure was not adapted in this study and only
the overall contingency rate was set a priori. The learning curves
could therefore not be assessed meaningfully and this constitutes
one of the limitations of the study. One potentially promising
avenue in this regard for future work would be to undertake
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computational modeling in order to estimate learning rates for
reward and punishment (Frank et al., 2007).
It should be noted that other clinically relevant indices to
assess the propensity for conditions that are often co-morbid with
anxiety, such as depression and trait anxiety, were not recorded.
It is therefore not possible to ascertain whether the pattern of
ﬁndings might diﬀer had other potentially co-morbid variables
also been included in the analyses.
One potential interpretation of the ﬁndings of better
performance on the part of the highly socially anxious group in
the most ambiguous learning conditions is that this was likely
to be moderated by a greater motivation to perform well as has
been indicated in other studies (Alden et al., 2004; Roelofs et al.,
2010). However, the present ﬁndings cannot be fully accounted
for in this manner as the highly socially anxious group were
no better in terms of overall performance in discriminating the
diﬀerent contingencies, and this would be expected if they were
more highly motivated in general.
Although comparable to that of other studies in the ﬁeld
using a similar approach, the sample size of the study is modest
and the sample is not ideally representative as it only includes
undergraduates. These as such constitute methodological
shortcomings of the study. In order to understand the clinical
implications of these ﬁndings, further analogue studies of social
anxiety will necessarily need to be accompanied by clinical
investigations of instrumental learning in social anxiety disorder.
Another limitation of the study is that as only faces were
employed as the learning and feedback stimuli, what cannot be
ascertained from the analysis of the present ﬁndings is whether
this tendency for a positive information processing bias or
a greater sensitivity to actual reinforcement contingencies in
instrumental learning is limited to particular contexts involving
socially relevant stimuli and/or socially evaluative feedback,
or whether it extends to non-social stimuli and/or non-social
feedback. In fact, no investigation to date has employed both
social and non-social variants of positive and negative feedback
stimuli (verbal or non-verbal) within a single learning paradigm
when assessing information processing biases as a function of
social anxiety. Future studies that do so will be able to target the
domain speciﬁcity of this propensity, which will be very beneﬁcial
in characterizing the dynamics of the cognitive mechanisms
associated with social anxiety.
Conclusion
An established probabilistic category learning paradigm was
adapted using social stimuli in the present study to determine
potential information processing biases in relation to social
anxiety. Two key ﬁndings emerged. First, highly socially anxious
people tended to be more accurate at determining actual
probabilistic contingencies under ambiguous conditions. Second,
the evidence suggests that the learning strategies used by the
high social anxiety group were characterized by an enhanced
avoidance of negatively reinforced stimuli. Assessing information
processing mechanisms that underlie reinforcement learning in
socially evaluative situations provides a promising avenue for
future exploration in the context of social anxiety.
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